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Posthuman Rights
If the primary human rights preoccupation of mainstream film and 
television is the ethical status of the human, Splice (Vincenzo Natali, 
2009) is far more interested in the ontological status of the human. 
This seems to me to reverse the human rights issue – rather than 
focus on which rights should be inherent to the human, Splice com-
plicates matters by asking how the human is constituted and there-
fore which rights should be extended in liminal cases.  In other 
words, if most recent catastrophe fictions express an anxiety over 
human descent into depravity and a loss of what makes us human, 
Splice asks the persistent question of what constitutes the “life” in 
the right to life.  In the film we encounter the genetically-engineered 
Dren who is a human-animal-technology hybrid and through this 
hybrid, the film allows us to think about which rights Dren is enti-
tled to.  I argue that Splice makes us engage affectively with human 
rights through the radical uncertainty of the category of the human, 
arguing that exclusion from human rights is in itself highly prob-
lematic.  I therefore conclude that rights run the risk of becoming an 
anthropological machine, as defined by Giorgio Agamben, by de-
limiting the human and thereby reinstating a kind of biopolitically 
racist, colonial discourse.
It is difficult, of course, to define what human rights are as there is 








Declaration of Human Rights and the different national implemen-
tations.  Such tension is not always an evil, as there must be room for 
cultural charters but inevitably such room also reduces the universal 
nature of human rights.  For this reason, I wish to proceed from the 
idea that human rights belong to a distinctive episteme which 
makes them historical and changeable.  This claim is uncontrover-
sial, since the emergence of human rights in themselves draw on a 
rich historical tradition of philosophical and political work.  What 
this epistemic understanding of human rights entails is, however, 
also the realization that the future of human rights will be different 
from what they are now.  One way to think this future episteme 
would be to consider how rights might change in a different envi-
ronment.  Such an environment is established by Splice and thereby 
allows us to consider the challenges of human rights to come.
My purpose in discussing Splice is not so much to analyze the 
film from an aesthetic point of view but rather to think human 
rights through the film and its aesthetics, what Daniel Frampton, 
following Gilles Deleuze, calls “filmosophy” (Frampton 2006).   As 
a phenomenological approach, I will argue that Splice creates a film-
world (as opposed to a life-world) which allows us to think thoughts 
different from our own and direct our attention towards something 
which does not exist but still performs cultural work - in particular 
Dren.  If we start with the fundamental issue at stake in Splice we 
find that genetic engineering is regarded as unproblematic and a 
benign science - the issue does not get muddled until human DNA 
is brought into the picture.  Biomedia technology is good and the 
argument that we find in the film is that biomedia helps people and 
will be responsible for an increase in global health.  The right to 
health is therefore an implicit reason for doing biomedia research. 
The two virtuoso scientist protagonists – Elsa and Clive – suggest 
that by adding human DNA to their experiments, they can help 
cure serious ailments ranging from Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s and 
different forms of cancer.  For Elsa and Clive, the right to health 
becomes a categorical imperative to perform their research; it is a 
necessary step to fulfill the right to health.  While the company Elsa 
and Clive work for does not agree, citing the international ban on 
human cloning, we find here an issue of what Richard Falk refers to 
as the power of rights (Falk 2008, 35).  The issue becomes whether 








globally is more significant than the ban on employing human clon-
ing and for Elsa and Clive, the right to health wins out.
Their argument for why what they are doing is the morally and 
ethically right thing to do is as Elsa says, that “Human cloning is 
illegal.  This won’t be human.  Not entirely.” We find here a zone of 
exclusion based on a form of impurity idealism – they are not break-
ing laws since they are technically not performing human cloning. 
We see here how the rights of humans become entangled with the 
ontological status of the human – Elsa and Clive insist on helping 
the human through a process of exclusion.  Inevitably, the rest of the 
film becomes an investigation into the consequences of this exclu-
sion and so helps us to see how both terms of human rights are in-
herently unstable.
It seems to me that we are faced here with one of the constitutive 
residual epistemic problems of human rights - since rights are his-
torically based on the rights of individual, white men, how do we 
extend this presumed universality into an actual universality?1 In 
this way I see the posthuman figure of Dren as a figuration of this 
epistemic anxiety, carried over into an ontological doubt over the 
category of the human thereby questioning the issue of what the 
future subaltern might be - might it be genetically modified clones? 
While the Universal Declaration has learned from the problems of 
the past and so has chosen the phrase “All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights” the question remains whether 
this phrase will be sufficient for the human rights to come.  Of 
course, there is an implicit definition of the human in the Universal 
Declaration Article 1 which continues “They [human beings] are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.”  This constitutes the human as 
not simply a sentient, reasoning being but (perhaps most signifi-
cantly) a moral being.
If we are to understand the condition of the human in Splice, it 
seems to me that this revolves around Elsa’s statement of Dren being 
1 In saying that human rights are historically based on the rights of individual, 
white men, I certainly do not wish to disparage the work done by a multitude 
of people for the building of human rights.  Rather, I simply follow the argument 
put forth by Andrew Clapham that much of the discourse of human rights arose 
from a Western context, where rights (typically of man) were described as a 
universal.  It is this conception of rights as universal and therefore inherently 








“not entirely human.” Of course, living after what Bruno Latour has 
termed the Great Divides, it becomes difficult to entirely trust any 
division between the human and the nonhuman (Latour 1993).  In-
stead it seems entirely possible that conscience will emerge as yet 
another breached dividing line separating humans from animals 
and plants, also considering of course Michel Foucault’s by now 
well-rehearsed argument that “[the hu]man is only a recent inven-
tion, a figure not yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowl-
edge” (Foucault 1994, xxiii).2  Indeed, when we investigate Dren’s 
actions and behavior it seems obvious that she is not only capable of 
reasoning but certainly also has a conscience alongside emotions.
Before we turn to these aspects of markers of a certain sense of 
the human, however, let me first address another potential protest 
against my argument that Dren is in fact as human as you and I:  her 
birth and existence as a result of biotechnology.  Such protest would 
then ignore or count as invalid arguments ranging from André 
Leroi-Gourhan (Gesture and Speech 1993) to Bernard Stiegler (Tech-
nics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus 1998) and those who have 
followed them in pointing out that the constitution of the human is 
inevitably bound up with tools and technology.  Therefore any pro-
test that Dren’s being is too technologically mediated only casts the 
rest of humanity outside such naturalist definition of the human.  In 
the end, and congruent with film phenomenological perspective, 
we are left with Dren’s actions rather than any a priori definitions or 
delimitations of the human.  Our guiding question is instead how 
Dren behaves and how we may relate such behavior to a human 
framework.
If we look at the moment of Dren’s birth as an instance of over-
coded significance, there are some aspects which are immediately 
telling, such as the grotesque technological womb from which Dren 
must be torn.  The odd being which emerges from the metal womb 
is distinctively alien and in this moment we would never ascribe 
the status of human to this oddity.  However, it turns out that what 
emerges is only the chrysalis for a different being entirely.  The bod-
ily metamorphosis which Dren undergoes here must remind us of 
similar metamorphoses, primarily the one found in Alien (Ridley 
2 I amend Foucault’s argument to explicitly include women, transgendered 









Scott 1979) and it is precisely with this juxtaposition that we find a 
difference which makes a difference.  Although the chrysalis is as 
disturbing as the facehugger of Scott’s film, what emerges in Splice 
is nowhere near as frightening as Alien’s chestburster.  Rather, the 
trepidatious creature ungainly wobbling around the lab might be 
more reminiscent of Bambi - a being with large eyes and spindly 
legs.  As Dren grows older, she grows to resemble a human girl and 
woman, the primary difference being a stinger tail.  This human 
identification also comes from Dren being dressed in a cute dress by 
Elsa as they play games, thereby establishing some degree of hu-
manity to Dren.  This degree of humanity is cemented for Elsa when 
Dren spells out “nerd” with Scrabble pieces as a recognition of the 
t-shirt Elsa wears - this act reveals that Dren can associate, thereby 
making her human.  It is also this scene which names Dren, as Elsa 
is annoyed with Clive referring to her as ”it.” Instead, Elsa says that 
her name is Dren, reading “nerd” backwards and thereby making 
the moment of association what humanizes Dren - she can associ-
ate, she can spell, she obtains language to some degree and this for 
Elsa makes Dren human.
What makes Dren human for us as spectators is a little different, 
I believe, although the above scene is pivotal.  However, it is also 
a matter of our growing sympathy for Dren.  To ouline this, I wish 
to turn to what Gilles Deleuze calls the affection-image, identified 
primarily as the close-up of a face (Deleuze 2005, 89).  I believe 
that it is the close-ups of Dren which humanize her for us, which 
convinces us of her right to the status as human and thereby en-
gages us affectively in what she is subjected to.  Deleuze argues 
that the close-up directs our attention towards poles of admiration 
and desire, something we find to be true in Splice as well.  The 
admiration for Dren comes in the sense of wonder we get as we 
gaze upon her face, the alien and the human blending seamlessly 
and casting us into the realization that Dren has emotions as hu-
man as our own.
When Dren has reached what appears to be her fully grown state, 
that of a young woman or teenager, she finds a box of toys includ-
ing a klopotec and a plastic tiara.  As she plays with these objects we 
see her reaction in a close-up and recognize the amazement and 
wonder she is filled with before this strange, fantastic world.  Her 








find in ourselves – Dren behaves like a curious child and although 
her body appears older, we understand her reactions and feelings. 
Although not in a close-up, we find a similar emotional attachment 
a little later, when Dren has found a cat that she wishes to keep and 
play with.  Her anguish at the cat being taken from her by Elsa re-
veals the inherent parent-child relationship between Elsa and Dren 
and also suggests that Dren is perfectly capable of forming emo-
tional bonds, something we also see in the fact that she draws por-
traits of both Elsa and Clive, just as children will do.
The second significant close-up suggests far darker passions, 
though no less human.  Clive dances with Dren in a moment of hap-
piness and as they dance the camera circles around them, giving us 
a sequence of shot/reverse shot close-ups of both Dren and Clive. 
Dren is caught up in the moment, laughing and happy and we are 
positioned in Clive’s point of view, with the speed of the film slow-
ing slightly down, allowing for Clive’s attention to Dren’s face.  As 
she gazes directly into our/Clive’s eyes we see desire reflected back 
at us - Clive finds a desire for Dren, just as she finds a desire for him 
and we as spectators recognize this desire in both of them and we 
feel uneasy about this convergence of desire, not because Dren is 
alien but precisely because she is human and the desire therefore 
feels incestuous.  This incestuous feeling is confirmed later on when 
Clive and Dren actually do have sex and Elsa discovers them; Clive 
has crossed an ethical boundary which of course mirrors Elsa’s 
transgression of placing her own DNA in the experiment, thereby 
turning Dren into a partial clone of her.
My argument here is simply that we gain sympathy and under-
standing for Dren and that the repulsion we feel later on occurs 
because we, by this point, have already conferred human status on 
Dren.  The affect which we feel for Dren thereby connect us to what 
happens to Dren and engages us in her life.  Precisely through the 
affection-image we accept the blurred and distended boundary be-
tween Dren and the human; she is for all intents and purposes hu-
man because we identify her as human.  Dren is therefore very far 
from the creature in Alien or even Sil in Species (Roger Donaldson 
1995), both beings who are affectively engaging precisely due to 
their inherent inhumanity rather than humanity.  With Dren, we 









The first right we should examine, then, seems to me to be most 
logically the right to life.  We know that this right in itself has been 
difficult and problematic to determine from a human rights per-
spective since there can be many different interpretations of when 
life begins.
In a recent case concerning a dispute between two es-
tranged parents of frozen embryos, the European Court of 
Human Rights held that: “in the absence of any European 
consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the be-
ginning of life, the issue of when the right to life begins 
comes within the margin of appreciation which the Court 
generally considers that States should enjoy in this sphere 
(Clapham 2007, 47).
It seems no coincidence that Elsa and Clive also speak of Dren in 
terms of the beginning of life using words such as “going full-term,” 
indicating that Dren has in fact gone full term and that therefore, 
consistent with the human aspects they both attribute Dren, she 
must have right to life.  Yet inevitably, this becomes exactly the point 
of contention alongside other concerns about how Dren can be treat-
ed.  Here my argument intersects with that of Giovanna Borradori’s 
although from a slightly different angle.  As we know, Borradori 
suggests that we may use atrocity photographs to read humanitar-
ian concerns and the need for human rights (Borradori 2011, 158). 
While he works with images of actual events, I work with images 
of potential events but considering the affective states which we 
enter when regarding Dren as human, these cinematic images re-
main not only images of suffering but also images as “complex 
processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange” (Bor-
radori 2011, 166) and thereby engage with iterations of human 
rights.  Splice may not be the unloading ramp at Auschwitz.  How-
ever, its images of incarceration and torture connect it to issues of 
human rights in similar ways.
One of the clearest ways of seeing how human rights become fig-
ured in Dren is the fact that Dren remains incarcerated throughout 
the film.  First she remains locked up in the lab but as this proves to 
be too risky, she is transferred to the barn of Elsa’s inherited home. 








she desires freedom, understood as the freedom to move around 
freely - the first thing she does when arriving at the farm is to run 
away to hunt and eat.  It is this act which makes Elsa and Clive in-
carcerate Dren and deny her access to an outside.  While at first there 
are no signs that Dren is mistreated or denied care while in the barn 
- she has toys, plenty of food, etc… – it is slowly revealed that she 
does feel detained and extremely unhappy about her current condi-
tion.  Significantly, the most direct form this dissatisfaction takes is 
once again through Scrabble.  Dren, when questioned about her un-
happiness, writes out ‘tedious’ in Scrabble letter tiles, thereby open-
ing up an unexpected avenue of the distinction of captivity.
Following Agamben and his idea of “the open,” which he draws 
from Heidegger, we find that captivation is the essence of animality 
because animals are not able to open themselves to the world “Cap-
tivation appears here as a sort of fundamental Stimmung in which 
the animal does not open itself, as does Dasein, in a world, yet is 
nevertheless ecstatically drawn outside of itself in an exposure 
which disrupts it in its every fiber” (Agamben 2003, 62).  Dren is, 
however, perfectly capable of opening herself towards the world, 
yearns for it, in fact, and so strains against the yoke of animality 
under which she is placed.  She recognizes intuitively what every 
human would recognize - that being placed under animal captivity, 
denied access to an openness to the world is a forceful operation 
and that “the place of this operation—in which human openness in 
a world and animal openness toward its disinhibitor seem for a mo-
ment to meet—is boredom” (Agamben 2004, 62). Dren feeling this 
tediousness of captivity shows that she recognizes the animal con-
ditions she is placed under; this animalization denies Dren her hu-
manity and thereby justifies her captivity for Elsa and Clive.  Yet at 
the same time it is because Dren recognizes her tedious captivity 
that we feel she is in fact human - she desires to seek out the open-
ness of the world and the denial of this constitutes therefore a viola-
tion of her rights.
Agamben’s complex concept of the open therefore not only re-
veals Dren to be human but also reveals a certain animality in Clive. 
Despite the taboo of incest, Clive is incapable of resisting Dren, 
much like the moth is incapable of resisting the flame.  The human-
animal binary is thereby broken down and we begin to see how 








puts it: “The open is nothing but a grasping of the animal not-open. 
Man suspends his animality and, in this way, opens a “free and 
empty” zone in which life is captured and a-bandoned (ab-bando-
nata) in a zone of exception” (Agamben 2003, 79).  Splice reveals that 
everything about Dren works as an anthropological machine – creat-
ing her as a nonhuman, imprisoning her and torturing her all be-
comes part of making ourselves human in opposition to her.  Our 
reach towards the open, our desire to move beyond animal captivity, 
however, is deconstructed at the same time, in the allure of Dren. 
The nonhuman Dren becomes attractive as she is revealed as more-
than-human, which also makes her terrifying and hence Dren must 
be punished.
This brings us to the issue of proportionality and the discussion 
of whether there is some form of legitimacy for what Elsa and Clive 
are doing to Dren or not.  They both seem somewhat concerned 
about the potential biohazard of letting Dren out of the lab at first, 
but it soon becomes evident that Dren does not pose a danger to 
anyone other than Elsa and Clive’s job security.  If we apply the 
schema set forth by Clapham, we find that there is no legitimate 
aim to Dren’s detention, nor is her detention described by clear or 
accessible law and finally her detention does not seem proportion-
ate to the aim  (Clapham 2007, 100).  Instead, the detention appears 
selfish and unnecessary, motivated by the personal aims of Elsa and 
Clive.  What ends up happening because of Dren’s incarceration is, 
however, another matter which also speaks to the results of over-
stepping human rights.  It is clear that Dren’s detention extends 
beyond simple matters of restrictions of space and movement; she 
is also denied her pet cat, food beyond the necessary sustenance 
and any other kind of engaging activity.  When denied her cat, Dren 
is in fact denied companionship and emotional relations and when 
Elsa decides to give Dren her cat back, Dren reacts in an extreme but 
understandable way - she removes the emotional stranglehold 
which the cat represents and simply kills it.  Of course, this act is 
enough for Elsa to subject Dren to cruel and unusual punishment, 
thereby creating the self-fulfilling condition that Dren is dangerous 
and must be constrained.
Dren’s punishment for killing the cat is to have her stinger tail cut 
off, while chained to the operating table.  No anesthesia is used, nor 








thing about the situation tells us that Dren deserves less respect 
than an animal and Elsa has no concerns about the age-old question 
“can they suffer?” It is necessary here to keep in mind the sympathy 
which has already been established for Dren in previous scenes in 
the film, alongside the fact that we see how the operation hurts her 
on both a physical level but also an emotional level as she does not 
understand her punishment in the first place nor why her parent 
would do something like this.  For us, but not for Elsa, it is evident 
that Dren reacts, behaves and has feelings like a human.  For Elsa, 
all that matters is the punishment which makes her act a clear ex-
ample of what Falk calls the rights of power (Falk 2008, 27).  The 
justification is inherent in the punishment as something which Elsa 
as maker is entitled to.
The torture and maiming of Dren therefore becomes a territorial 
struggle not so much over the rights of Dren but over her status as 
human or lab animal.  Elsa never hesitates to question or consider 
if what she is doing is acceptable in relation to Dren and so Dren’s 
rights are erased, are never regarded as even a possibility.  Elsa and 
Clive only discuss what they did as a mistake because they over-
stepped medical-ethical boundaries, never their treatment of Dren 
as problematic – Dren is outside the human, at times even outside 
the animal as a form of non-being.  This is not the case for us as 
spectators; we are involved as much in Dren’s suffering as we are 
in Elsa and Clive’s.  We therefore feel for the unjust treatment of 
Dren and while we never truly accept her reactions as ethical or 
justifiable, we do understand why Dren does what she does.  Dren, 
for us, is human and she is placed under torture.  This is the main 
point of the film, for by sympathizing and empathizing with Dren 
we constitute her as human and do not worry about her origins or 
ontological status as human; her emotions and feelings are enough 
for our recognition of the human Dren.
Interestingly, then, it is precisely the dehumanizing act of torture 
which for us turns Dren into a human – because she and we recog-
nize those acts precisely as torture, as something which Dren suf-
fers under, we understand that she is human.  My closing argument 
will therefore be that human rights are what constitutes an anthro-
pological machine in Agamben’s terminology.  Agamben discusses 








the human) through a zone of exclusion and indeterminacy, a ma-
chine which can only function 
by establishing a zone of indifference at their centers, 
within which—like a “missing link” which is always lack-
ing because it is already virtually present—the articu-
lation between human and animal, man and non-man, 
speaking being and living being, must take place.  Like 
every space of exception, this zone is, in truth, perfectly 
empty, and the truly human being who should occur 
there is only the place of a ceaselessly updated decision 
in which the caesurae and their rearticulation are always 
dislocated and displaced anew (Agamben 2004, 37-38 
[emphasis in original]).
Splice performs the same machinic function of creating a zone of ex-
clusion – the genetically engineered human – in order to include the 
non-modified human, but at the same time the film also problema-
tizes this exclusion precisely by insisting on human characteristics in 
Dren and the morally bankrupt mistreatment of her.  Although 
Splice takes a speculative approach as befits its science fiction pedi-
gree, the film does question this process of exclusion in a world 
where biotechnology and genetic engineering is fast becoming eve-
ryday practice.  While human cloning remains some way off, issues 
such as tissue engineering, gene therapy and gene matching of chil-
dren are present concerns which run the risk of reproducing distinc-
tively racist and colonialist discourses, especially if the Universal 
Declaration remains vague and deferential about the meaning and 
beginning of human life as a matter for individual States.
Colonialist discourse seems especially prone to be reactivated, if 
only in reverse, when we consider the way biotech is currently con-
ceived - as an invasion of the “pure” human body, even if it is for 
good.  This is also what Splice suggests with its invasive, incestuous 
insemination of the human with the nonhuman.  We are captivated 
and invaded but from the inside, by our own inventions - we shape 
our technologies and then they shape us.  The familiar colonialist 
discourse is therefore continued and configured in new ways under 
a regime of biomedia.  The ontology of the human, in other words, 








relation to biomedia.  As has been evident throughout human his-
tory, the category of the human has often been exclusive, although 
with the introduction of human rights this exclusivity has been ex-
tended to all humans, at least in principle.  Yet there are certain in-
stances where the status of the human is ambiguous, such as the 
beginning of life.  Human rights, especially in an age of rights, inad-
vertently become an anthropological machine embedded in dis-
courses of the human as much as the discourses of rights.  Therefore 
it seems that the status of the human, as much as the status of rights, 
can become a territorial struggle and we do need to ask ourselves if 
the rights of the human trumps the rights to be human and what this 
will mean for the human rights to come.
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